An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks

Bo-wei YANG; Guang-hua SONG; Yao ZHENG

doi:10.1631/jzus.C0910727

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An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks

计算机与自动化 | Updated：2022-08-31

- An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks
- An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks
- 信息与电子工程前沿（英文） 2010年11卷第12期页码：967-975
- Affiliations：
  
  1.Center for Engineering and Scientific Computation, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
  2.School of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
  3.School of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
- Author bio：
  
  E-mail:boweiy@zju.edu.cn
  ghsong@zju.edu.cn
  yao.zheng@zju.edu.cn
- Funds：
- DOI：10.1631/jzus.C0910727
  中图分类号：
- 收稿：2009-11-27，
  
  修回：2010-09-28，
  
  录用：2010-08-19，
  
  纸质出版：2010-12
- Accepted：
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An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks[J]. 信息与电子工程前沿（英文）, 2010,11(12):967-975.

Bo-wei YANG, Guang-hua SONG, Yao ZHENG. An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2010, 11(12): 967-975.
An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks[J]. 信息与电子工程前沿（英文）, 2010,11(12):967-975. DOI： 10.1631/jzus.C0910727.

Bo-wei YANG, Guang-hua SONG, Yao ZHENG. An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks[J]. Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2010, 11(12): 967-975. DOI： 10.1631/jzus.C0910727.

摘要

Abstract

We propose an incentive model based on information-hiding to encourage peers to vote for resources in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. The following are key motives for our model: (1) Some trust and reputation systems have been deployed in modern P2P systems

but a lot of blank rating resources exist in these P2P systems; (2) E-commerce consumer-to-consumer (C2C) websites that adopt simple rating strategies are receiving accusations that false and useless ratings are flooded. We establish an information-hiding based RRR/RIR (resource reputation rating/reputation incentive rating) voting model

which awards or punishes voters according to their behaviors. The RRR generating algorithm and the RIR generating algorithm are presented in detail

and the information-hiding mechanism is given. Experimental results showed that the incentive RRR/RIR model can effectively encourage valid voting and prevent malicious or arbitrary voting in the P2P reputation system.

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